19 NEV. L.J. 313, CROOKER

3/24/2019 5:10 PM

HEY, NEIGHBOR: HOMEOWNERS’
ASSOCIATIONS, SUPER-PRIORITY LIENS,
AND THE NEED FOR BALANCED RIGHTS IN
NEVADA
Rebecca Crooker*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................
I. ALL HAIL UNIFORMITY: THE HISTORY OF HOMEOWNERS’
ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICA................................................................
A. Let’s Get Our Act Together: The Creation and
Implementation of the Uniform Common Interest Ownership
Act ...............................................................................................
1. Condominiums ......................................................................
2. Planned Developments .........................................................
3. Cooperatives .........................................................................
4. Consolidation ........................................................................
B. Everyone Has to Pay Their Dues: Unpaid Assessments and
the Super-Priority Lien ...............................................................
II. THE COURTS SPLIT: NEVADA AND THE SUPER-PRIORITY LIEN ..........
A. The Judicial System Provides Clarity? .......................................
III. BANKS HAVE RIGHTS. HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS HAVE
RIGHTS. WHAT ABOUT THE HOMEOWNERS? ......................................
A. HOAs Gone Wild.........................................................................
B. Hands in the Cookie Jar..............................................................
C. No More Block Parties................................................................
IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? ........................................................
A. The Path Forward is Paved with Legislation..............................
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................

314
314

318
318
319
319
320
321
323
328
330
332
333
334
336
336
338

* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2019, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Thank you to my amazing husband, Chris, for his unwavering encouragement
and support, and for inspiring me to write about this topic. Thank you to my mother for
teaching me the “three Rs” and more importantly, for teaching me how to work hard and to
persevere. Lastly, thank you to Professor Linda Edwards, for teaching me what a powerful
and beautiful tool legal writing can be.

313

19 NEV. L.J. 313, CROOKER

314

3/24/2019 5:10 PM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:1

INTRODUCTION
“Houses are built to live in, and not to look on, therefore let use be preferred
before uniformity, except where both may be had.”—Francis Bacon1
Common-Interest communities and Homeowners’ Associations (“HOAs”)
are as much a part of American history as Ford Motors. Initially created as a
space for the elite to reside, common-interest communities soon gained popularity as a pleasant and affordable living option for lower-income families.2
Over time, the option to purchase a home not regulated by a homeowners’ association has become severely limited. In 2016, the number of homeowners’
associations in the United States was estimated to be 342,000.3
With the rise of the homeowners’ associations has come a complex set of
problems. Nevada specifically has struggled to determine where the boundaries
of power lie, as HOA-initiated foreclosures have risen exponentially since the
Great Recession.4 The foreclosure epidemic shines a spotlight on the imbalance
of power that exists between homeowners’ associations and the homeowner.
The Covenants, Conditions, & Restrictions (CC&Rs) that bind homeowners’
associations often give a small group of people nearly unlimited power to impose whatever restrictions they deem necessary.5 These restrictions can infringe
on even the most intimate details of a resident’s life.6
This article will examine the imbalance of power between homeowners’
associations and homeowners, and how the super-priority epidemic in Nevada
is a symptom of this imbalance. Part I will examine the history of homeowners’
associations in the United States before turning to an examination of the unique
problems faced by Nevada in Part II. Part III will discuss the stark imbalance in
power between the associations and homeowners. Part IV will discuss solutions
to correct the imbalance of power in Nevada and restore homeowners’ associations to the role that they were originally designed to fulfill.
I.

ALL HAIL UNIFORMITY: THE HISTORY OF HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS
IN AMERICA

In modern America, homeowners’ associations are as much a fixture in the
suburban setting as the corner Starbucks. However, they are a relatively recent
1

FRANCIS BACON, ESSAYS CIVIL AND MORAL 141 (Cassell & Company Ltd. 1905).
See infra Part I.
3 CMTY. ASS’NS INST., NATIONAL AND STATE STATISTICAL REVIEW FOR 2016 COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION DATA 1 (2016), https://foundation.caionline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2
016StatsReviewFBWeb.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LAD-V97F] [hereinafter CAI REPORT]
(showing increase in number of HOAs from 1970 to 2016).
4 Kylee Gloeckner, Note, Nevada’s Foreclosure Epidemic: Homeowner Associations’ Super-Priority Liens Not So “Super” for Some, 15 NEV. L.J. 326, 326–27 (2014).
5 Paula A. Franzese, Privatization and Its Discontents: Common Interest Communities and
the Rise of Government for “the Nice,” 37 URB. LAW. 335, 336 (2005).
6 See infra Section III.A.
2
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phenomenon and their rise to prominence and power has been meteoric.7 Although HOAs do provide certain benefits to the neighborhood, such as protecting property values and providing residents with common spaces, their governmental structure also serves to deprive the homeowner of certain liberties
traditionally possessed by property owners.8
American property law evolved from the English legal tradition, where an
individual possessing property in fee simple absolute was free to do whatever
he wished with his land.9 A property owner could sell his land it, build on it,
and assign a portion or all of his interests to another person.10 As property law
evolved, the use of “covenants” came to be frequently utilized in expanding
neighborhoods.11 A covenant could restrict land to be used only for certain purposes, and in some cases, covenants imposed restrictions upon land for the
foreseeable future.12 Originally, an individual could only enforce a restrictive
covenant while maintaining ownership of the parcel bound by the covenant, but
developers soon began to search for a solution that would allow them to impose
and enforce covenants, despite selling all ownership interests.13 Enter homeowners’ associations.14
Homeowners’ associations were organizations created by developers for
the purpose of enforcing covenants, as well as promulgating new rules as the
need arose.15 One of the first cases to formally recognize the power of a homeowners’ association was Neponsit Property Owners’ Association v. Emigrant
Industrial Savings Bank, in which the court held that a covenant requiring
homeowners to pay fees for the purpose of maintaining common areas did
“ ‘touch or concern’ the land.”16 The obligation to pay fees would therefore
pass to future owners and was enforceable by the HOA.17
During their inception, HOAs were connected with the development of
wealthy communities. However, after the Great Depression, the Federal Housing Administration and the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation made it possible

7

See CAI REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 (showing increase in number of HOAs from 1970 to
2016).
8 See David L. Callies et al., Ramapo Looking Forward: Gated Communities, Covenants,
and Concerns, 35 URB. LAW. 177, 184 (2003).
9 Paul Boudreaux, Homes, Rights, and Private Communities, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
479, 483 n.13 (2009).
10 Id.
11 Id. at 484.
12 See Id. (discussing Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Chanc. 1848)).
13 Id. at 485.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. (quoting Neponsit Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793
(N.Y. 1938)).
17 See Neponsit Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, 15 N.E.2d at 798.
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for lower-income individuals to obtain financing for homes.18 This in turn led
to the rise of planned communities for the “average” American.19 After World
War II, large residential communities became the norm, and from 1940 to
1960, homeownership increased from 44 percent to 62 percent.20 These new
developments incorporated restrictive covenants dictating how homeowners
could use their property, as famously illustrated by Abraham Levitt—one such
developer who fined homeowners for failing to properly maintain their lawns.21
During the 1960s and 1970s, prospective homeowners realized that by pooling
their resources with others in the community, they could enjoy amenities they
would otherwise be unable to afford.22 This attraction contributed to the rise of
common-interest communities, such as condominiums, co-ops, and planned
unit developments (“PUDs”).23 The power of the restrictive covenant also allowed homeowners to control the type of individual that could purchase in their
neighborhood.24 Racially restrictive covenants became popular in neighborhoods where Caucasian individuals wanted to maintain the white-washed aesthetics of their communities.25
Over time, the HOAs’ self-governing role caused it to be embraced by local municipalities as well as the State.26 Because the HOA dictates the behavior
and appearance of its community, it theoretically maintains the property value
of the community’s homes.27 After the 1970s, mortgage securitization provided
the dual advantage of allowing investors access to mortgage markets as a potential investment as well as giving lenders increased liquidity.28 This development has decreased the autonomy that a homeowner once had—today, the
homeowner is tied to a global market, which in turn shapes the community in
which he lives.29
While the HOAs’ rise in popularity was partially due to the image of stability and a homogeny that was appealing to many, today a potential homeowner
often lacks a choice in whether to reside in an HOA community.30 In 1970, 2.1
18

See Boudreaux, supra note 9, at 486; James Fraser et al., The Privatization of Neighborhood Governance and the Production of Urban Space, 48 ENV’T & PLAN. 844, 847 (2016).
19 See Boudreaux, supra note 9, at 486.
20 Priya S. Gupta, Governing the Single-Family House: A (Brief) Legal History, 37 U. HAW.
L. REV. 187, 197 (2015).
21 Fraser et al., supra note 18, at 847.
22 UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT prefatory note at 6 (1982) (NAT’L CONFERENCE
COMM’RS UNIF. STATE LAWS, amended 2014) [hereinafter UCIOA].
23 Id.
24 Boudreaux, supra note 9, at 486–87.
25 Id.
26 See Fraser et al., supra note 18, at 848.
27 See Callies et al., supra note 8, at 180–81.
28 Fraser et al., supra note 18, at 848.
29 Id.
30 See CAI REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 (illustrating the number of homeowners’ associations
in 2016 as opposed to 1970).
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million American residents lived in 10,000 community associations.31 By 2016,
69 million residents lived in 342,000 community associations.32 Some cities are
so reliant on HOAs to maintain individual communities that they refuse to issue
permits to developers who have not filed for an application to create CC&Rs
and a homeowners’ association.33 As a result, most new residential developments involve a homeowners’ association.34 And, as HOAs have increased in
prominence, they have also increased in power.35 Often, the increase in power
gives rise to an increase in problems.
Originally the CC&Rs resembled zoning laws and governed issues such as
whether developments would be limited to single-family homes and whether
they could contain both one and two-story residences.36 However, CC&Rs today govern a much broader swath of issues.37 HOAs, although regulated by the
state, are not governmental organizations and consequently lack the restrictions
that bind public entities.38 As long as the HOA board is “in accordance” with
the original CC&Rs, an HOA is free to promulgate additional rules.39 An HOA
may govern what color a homeowner may paint their house, whether they may
have a reduced-water landscape, whether they can put a “for-sale” sign in front
of their house, what type of pets are allowed, and even the type of curtains
hanging indoors.40 While undoubtedly there are some that look askance at their
neighbors and give thanks that Cousin Eddie won’t be able to pull up in the RV
and dump the contents into the sewer,41 the fact remains that homeowners are
severely limited as to how they can use their property.
In addition to imposing restrictions, HOAs have various methods of enforcing rules. Some communities utilize a stern letter or a targeted warning in
the weekly newsletter, while other associations freely dispense fines in re31

Id.
Id.
33 Fraser et al., supra note 18, at 848.
34 See Lisa J. Chadderdon, No Political Speech Allowed: Common Interest Developments,
Homeowners Associations, and Restrictions on Free Speech, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
233, 236–37 (2006).
35 See infra Section III.A.
36 See Boudreaux, supra note 9, at 491.
37 Id. (“The covenants in the experimental days of Tulk and Neponsit addressed only fundamental matters, such as assuring that the land remained residential and that payments be
made to support the HOA and common areas. Today, however, sets of HOA covenants have
grown increasingly complex and have intruded more deeply into the ‘castle’ of the homeowner.”).
38 Id. at 493.
39 Id.
40 Barbara Holland, Homeowner Blocked from Posting For-Sale Sign, LAS VEGAS REV. J.
(Dec. 20, 2015 5:05 AM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/homes/resale-news/homeowner-b
locked-from-posting-for-sale-sign/ [https://perma.cc/C4DS-CFJ5]; see Boudreaux, supra
note 9, at 509 (discussing amendment of Florida state code to allow homeowners to have a
reduced-water landscape); Franzese, supra note 5, at 336.
41 See NATIONAL LAMPOON’S CHRISTMAS VACATION (Warner Bros. 1989).
32
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sponse to actual or perceived violations.42 These fines can pile up and—in
some jurisdictions—allow the association to foreclose on the home without judicial approval, assuming first-lien position over the lending bank.43 Initially
proposed in the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, these “superpriority liens” have been heavily litigated with a number of different results.44
A. Let’s Get Our Act Together: The Creation and Implementation of the
Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act
In order to understand the legal power that HOAs today possess, it is best
to start with a historical understanding of the laws that govern them, specifically: the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA).45 The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws passed the UCIOA in
1982, after nine years of research and drafting.46
Prior to the UCIOA, condominiums were highly regulated by state statutes
which typically lacked adequate consumer protection provisions.47 Cooperatives and planned developments were regulated less stringently, and the
governing laws often contained confusing language and misused terms, giving
property owners different “bundles of rights” and causing difficulties for lenders attempting to assess the best method of financing for a particular state.48
1. Condominiums
The first uniform act—the Uniform Condominium Act—was adopted by
the Conference in 1977.49 Prior to 1977, many states modeled their statutes after Puerto Rico’s 1958 statute concerning condominium governance, or the
1962 Federal Housing Administration’s model condominium statute.50 However, these statutes proved inadequate as condominiums gained in popularity, due
to the notable absence of consumer protection provisions and lack of flexibility
governing the use and creation of condominiums.51 States, responding to these
concerns, drafted a second-generation of statutes, which soon proved to highlight other areas lacking in regulation.52 Furthermore, states varied widely in
42

Franzese, supra note 5, at 342; Daniel Goldmintz, Note, Lien Priorities: The Defects of
Limiting the “Super Priority” for Common Interest Communities, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 267,
283 (2011).
43 Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 330.
44 See infra Section I.B.
45 UCIOA prefatory note at 6 (1982) (NAT’L CONFERENCE COMM’RS UNIF. STATE LAWS,
amended 2014).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 7.
48 Id. at 6.
49 Id. at 7–8.
50 Id. at 7.
51 Id.
52 Id.
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their language and interpretations, causing the Conference to adopt the Uniform
Condominium Act (“UCA”).53
2. Planned Developments
The Conference adopted the second uniform act—the Uniformed Planned
Community Act—in 1980.54 Planned communities were partially a by-product
of zoning laws intended to maximize available land by clustering together new
housing.55 Because these planned communities emerged from local governments and zoning ordinances, rather than state statutes, they operated for years
under common law.56 However, common law was unable to address all of the
regulatory issues and consumer protection concerns that statutes were addressing for condominiums.57 Developers also began to favor planned communities
over condominiums in order to avoid the disclosure and escrow requirements,
as well as restricted practices associated with the regulated condominiums.58
Furthermore, lack of regulation meant that the HOAs that emerged with these
planned communities came in all shapes and sizes. In response, the Uniform
Planned Act, closely modeling the Uniform Condominium Act, was adopted.59
3. Cooperatives
The third Uniform Act adopted by the Conference was the Model Real Estate Cooperative Act, adopted in 1981.60 In 1978, the Conference decided that
the Uniform Planned Community Act and the Uniform Condominium Act
should be identical whenever possible, envisioning a future where the two Acts
would be consolidated.61 Thus, the Model Real Estate Cooperative Act mirrored the two prior Acts wherever possible.62 The Conference drafted the Act
with the goal of providing lenders, developers, and consumers a “coherent and
consistent pattern of rights and obligations applicable to all ‘common interest’
developments, whether organized as condominiums, planned communities or
cooperatives.”63

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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4. Consolidation
The Conference’s adoption of the UCIOA consolidated the three prior Acts
and added generic definitions.64 The “condominium” was defined as a common-interest community where “portions of the real estate are designated for
separate ownership and the remainder of the real estate is designated for common ownership solely by the owners of those portions.”65 The “cooperative”
was defined as a common-interest community where “the real estate is owned
by an association, each of whose members is entitled by virtue of his ownership
interest in the association to exclusive possession of a unit.”66 “Planned community” was meant to include any type of common-interest community that
was not a condominium or cooperative.67 Most importantly, the “commoninterest community” definition stated that “ ‘[c]ommon-[i]nterest [c]ommunity’
means real estate with respect to which any person, by virtue of his ownership
of a unit, is obligated to pay for real estate taxes, insurance premiums, maintenance or improvement of other real estate described in a declaration.”68
The language and section numbering of the UCIOA followed its predecessors as much as possible, but important differences between the Acts were preserved when necessary.69 The result was designed to offer states choices when
considering legislation for common-interest communities.70 States desiring to
implement legislation touching all common-interest communities could adopt
the UCIOA.71 States wanting to regulate for the first time or to modernize their
regulations regarding condominiums, cooperatives, or planned communities
were able to adopt one of the earlier acts.72 Furthermore, the drafters wrote with
the intent that a state having previously adopted one of the three original acts
could, with few amendments, adopt the UCIOA, thereby extending coverage to
all forms of community ownership.73
The important components of the UCIOA’s definition of the commoninterest community were (1) a “unit” must exist within the common-interest
community that is a both a physical piece of the real estate and designed for

64

Norman Geis, Beyond the Condominium: The Uniform Common-Interest Ownership Act,
17 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 757, 758–59 (1982).
65 Id. at 760 (quoting UCIOA § 1-103(8) (1982) (NAT’L CONFERENCE COMM’RS UNIF. STATE
LAWS, amended 2014)).
66 Id. (quoting UCIOA § 1-103(10) (1982) (NAT’L CONFERENCE COMM’RS UNIF. STATE
LAWS, amended 2014)).
67 Id. at 761.
68 Id. at 759 (quoting UCIOA § 1-103(7) (1982) (NAT’L CONFERENCE COMM’RS UNIF. STATE
LAWS, amended 2014)).
69 UCIOA prefatory note at 10 (1982) (NAT’L CONFERENCE COMM’RS UNIF. STATE LAWS,
amended 2014).
70 Id. at 11.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
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separate occupancy.74 The unit’s “owner must make the designated payments
with respect to ‘other real estate described in a declaration;’ and (2) those payments must be mandatory.”75 These developments “thus exclude from UCIOA
any development where there is no division of the property into ‘units’ and
‘other real estate’ and any such development organized on a voluntary rather
than compulsory membership basis.”76
B. Everyone Has to Pay Their Dues: Unpaid Assessments and the SuperPriority Lien
Common-interest communities have historically imposed fees as a way to
pay for community expenses such as property management, landscaping service, utilities, and insurance, as well as community amenities such as clubhouses and pools.77 The drafters of the UCA, and later the UCIOA, foresaw that
common-interest associations would need to protect their interest in these
fees.78 Thus, the UCIOA included a way for the association to collect delinquent fees: the UCIOA allows common-interest associations who are owed fees
to move into “super-priority” status ahead of other creditors by recouping unpaid assessments in a foreclosure action.79
A lien operates by attaching to a property and serving as a flag that the titleholder has an unpaid debt, and that the property is collateral for that debt.80 If
the titleholder fails to repay what he owes, the lienholder may foreclose on the
property, using the funds from the sale to attempt and recoup the cost of the
debt.81 When multiple liens exist on a property, they are ranked in order to determine who has priority in the repayment of the loans.82 The debt with the
highest priority is the senior lienholder, and all other liens are junior to it.83
Should a senior lienholder foreclose on the property, all junior liens are extinguished.84 However, if a junior lienholder forecloses, all senior liens remain intact, and the property passes to the new owner burdened by these encumbrances.85 The traditional order of liens under statutory law is as follows: real estate
taxes, and after the taxes are paid, the first mortgage, followed by any second74

Geis, supra note 64, at 759–60.
Id. at 760.
76 Id.
77 See Goldmintz, supra note 42, at 268.
78 Id. at 274.
79 Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 329 (describing Nevada’s statutory super priority lien provision).
80 Goldmintz, supra note 42, at 270.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 268–69.
83 Id. at 269.
84 Andrea J. Boyack & William E. Foster, Muddying the Waterfall: How Ambiguous Liability Statutes Distort Creditor Priority in Condominium Foreclosures, 67 ARK. L. REV. 225,
227 (2014).
85 Id. at 234–36.
75
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ary mortgages and all other liens.86 The prioritization of the mortgages is, in
part, common sense—the mortgager typically has much more at stake than the
other lienholders on the property, and common law has traditionally respected
the principle of “first in time, first in right.”87
The super-priority lien, however, breaks this traditional chain, allowing the
HOA to assume position over the senior lienholders, both allowing foreclosure
and extinguishing all subsequently subordinated liens.88 Proponents of the super-priority lien assert that when one homeowner in a common owner association defaults, the burden of the unpaid assessments then falls to the remaining
owners.89 The HOA must either spread the cost to the homeowners or reduce
the services and amenities it provides.90 Additionally, pro-HOA groups assert
that by allowing the mortgager to remain senior in such situations, the harm to
the community only multiplies.91 In a weak economy, a bank is incentivized to
delay foreclosure proceedings until the market appears to recover, in order to
get the biggest dollar amount possible.92 This delay causes delinquent assessments to increase, furthering the burden on the association and community.93
The UCIOA created a limited priority over mortgages in first-lien position,
providing associations with six months’ worth of assessments due immediately
upon a lien enforcement.94 UCIOA provisions were intended to provide balance
between the protection of lenders’ security interests and the protection of the
association’s deficient operating expenses.95 As of 2013, at least twenty jurisdictions, including Nevada, have put a statutory provision in place to provide
associations with super-priority position for at least six months of unpaid assessments.96 In theory, this provision was meant to encourage banks to simply
institute foreclosure proceedings and pay off the nominal amount owed to the
associations.97 However, both the interpretations and implementation of the
statutes have varied. The states differ widely on details, such as whether collection costs and attorneys’ fees are included in the liens, whether the lien assumes
86

Casey Perkins, Note, Privatopia in Distress: The Impact of the Foreclosure Crisis on
Homeowners’ Associations, 10 NEV. L.J. 561, 569 (2010).
87 Goldmintz supra note 42, at 270–71, 271 n.24.
88 Perkins, supra note 86, at 569.
89 Id. at 568.
90 Boyack & Foster, supra note 84, at 239.
91 Perkins, supra note 86, at 572–73.
92 Id. at 570.
93 Id.
94 UCIOA § 3-116 (1982) (NAT’L CONFERENCE COMM’RS UNIF. STATE LAWS, amended
2014); Goldmintz, supra note 42, at 268–69.
95 UNIF. CONDO. ACT § 3-116 cmts. 1 & 2 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS 1980).
96 JOINT EDITORIAL BD. FOR UNIF. REAL PROP. ACTS, THE SIX-MONTH “LIMITED PRIORITY
LIEN” FOR ASSOCIATION FEES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT 2–3
(2013); Boyack & Foster, supra note 84, at 262.
97 UNIF. CONDO. ACT § 3-116 cmt. 2 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS 1980).
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priority over first and second position mortgages, and whether the statute applies to homeowners’ associations, condominium associations, or both.98
These differences and the uncertainty over what exactly the super-priority
lien guarantees have resulted in widely varying interpretations in legislatures
and courts across the country.99 The Great Recession, followed by unemployment and foreclosures forced the vagueness surrounding the super-priority liens
into the spotlight.100 To lend some clarity to this struggle, the UCIOA was
amended in 2014 to clarify that the super-priority lien is a true lien, not merely
a payment-priority lien, and that when an association forecloses on a property,
the lender’s interest is not extinguished unless the association provided proper
notice.101
II. THE COURTS SPLIT: NEVADA AND THE SUPER-PRIORITY LIEN
Nowhere was the debate about super-priority liens more heated than Nevada.102 In 1991, Nevada adopted and modified the UCIOA.103 The act was introduced as Assembly Bill 221, and after adoption, introduced by the legislature as
Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) Chapter 116, or the Nevada Uniform Common
Interest Ownership Act.104 NRS 116 governs common-interest associations and
states in part:
A lien under this section is prior to all other liens and encumbrances on a unit
except: . . . [a] first security interest on the unit recorded before the date on
which the assessment sought to be enforced became delinquent or, in a cooperative, the first security interest encumbering only the unit’s owner’s interest and
perfected before the date on which the assessment sought to be enforced became
delinquent . . . . A lien under this section is prior to all security interests described in paragraph (b) of subsection 2 to the extent of: [a]ny charges incurred
by the association on a unit pursuant to NRS 116.310312 [and to the extent of
t]he unpaid amount of assessments, not to exceed an amount equal to assessments for common expenses based on the periodic budget adopted by the association pursuant to NRS 116.3115 which would have become due in the absence
of acceleration during the 9 months immediately preceding the date on which
the notice of default and election to sell is recorded pursuant to paragraph (b) of
subsection 1 of NRS 116.31162 . . . .”105

Under NRS 116, nine months of delinquent assessments (six months prior
to the statute’s amendment), places an HOA into first-lien position over a
98

Boyack & Foster, supra note 84, at 254–55, 254 n.164.
See generally id. at 255–58.
100 Aušra Gaigalaitė, Note, Priority of Condominium Associations’ Assessment Liens vis-àvis Mortgages: Navigating in the Super-Priority Lien Jurisdictions, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
841, 848 (2017).
101 Id.
102 See generally Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 327–28.
103 Id. at 329.
104 Id.
105 NEV. REV. STAT. § 116.3116(2)–(3) (2017).
99
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mortgage lender, enabling the HOA to institute a non-judicial foreclosure.106
The foreclosure starts with the association recording a “notice of delinquent assessment (‘NDA’).”107 Recording the NDA is optional, but most associations
choose to record it.108 Within thirty days of the mailing of the NDA, the association may record a “notice of default and election to sell the unit” (NOD).109
Ninety days after the NOD is recorded, the association must give notice of the
sale “in the manner and for a time not less than that required by law for the sale
of real property upon execution.”110 The property is then sold at a cash auction
to a third-party buyer who typically pays far below market value.111 Once the
association receives the funds from the sale, the proceeds are applied as follows:
“(1) The reasonable expenses of sale; (2) The reasonable expenses of securing
possession before sale, holding, maintaining, and preparing the unit for sale, including payment of taxes and other governmental charges, premiums on hazard
and liability insurance, and, to the extent provided for by the declaration, reasonable attorney’s fees and other legal expenses incurred by the association; (3)
Satisfaction of the association’s lien; (4) Satisfaction in the order of priority of
any subordinate claim of record; and (5) Remittance of any excess to the unit’s
owner.”112

Originally, the bank’s lien remained in place, and if the third-party buyer
failed to satisfy this lien upon the purchase of the house, the bank would simply
institute foreclosure proceedings upon the new owners.113
In response to this process, both mortgage lenders and third-party buyers
began to institute proceedings challenging the vagueness of NRS 116, which
set forth the provisions for foreclosure proceedings.114 The first battle dealt
with what types of costs could be included under the assessments.115 In 2006,
prior to the enactment of nine months of unpaid assessments, the Court held in
Korbel Family Trust v. Spring Mountain Ranch Master Ass’n that the six
months of unpaid assessments could include interest, legal fees, and collection
costs.116 In 2009, after complaints about excessive collection costs, the Nevada
Legislature enacted a law limiting associations to fees “reasonable” to collecting delinquent obligations.117 In 2012, the State of Nevada Department of
106

See Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 330.
Id. at 333.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 328.
112 Id. at 333 (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 116.31164(3)(c) (2017)).
113 Id. at 334.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 330.
116 Id. at 330 (citing Order, Korbel Family Trust v. Spring Mountain Ranch Master Ass’n,
No. 06-A-523959-C (Nev. Dist. Ct. Dec. 22, 2006)).
117 Id. at 330–31.
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Business and Industry, Real Estate Division (“NRED”), issued an advisory
opinion stating that “costs of collecting” are not included in a lien under NRS
116.3116.118 If the association incurs more than nine months of delinquent assessments and other costs associated with the foreclosure process, the homeowner becomes personally liable for the expenses.119 If the homeowner fails to
pay these expenses, the HOA is limited to recouping its costs from the foreclosure sale.120
The second issue to be widely litigated was whether the mortgage lender’s
lien survived the super-priority lien, or whether it was extinguished in the foreclosure, allowing the third-party buyer to assume title free of encumbrances.121
The litigants were split into two groups: the first group supported the interests
of the HOAs and the third-party buyers, and argued that the bank’s liens were
extinguished in the foreclosure.122 The second group supported the interests of
the banks and argued that the subordinate liens survived the foreclosure—
giving banks both the potential to collect some proceeds from the auction and
the right to foreclose on the third-party buyer should they fail to satisfy the
property’s existing encumbrances.123
Nevada courts interpreting NRS 116 were split into pro-HOA and pro-bank
camps as well.124 The courts debated over the language of NRS 116, with the
pro-HOA litigants arguing that because the CC&Rs were recorded prior to the
lender recording the deed of trust, the HOAs’ liens were “first in time and,
therefore, first in right.”125 However, pro-bank courts asserted that a first mortgage that is recorded prior to a deficiency in the assessments assumes seniority
to all except the nine months of delinquent assessments.126
Additionally, the courts have looked to legislative intent in trying to determine how to interpret NRS 116.127 From 1991 to 2009, the legislature did not
make any changes to the super-priority-lien language, with the exception of the
118

Nev. Dep’t of Bus. & Indus., Real Estate Div., Advisory No. 13-01, The Super Priority
Lien at 10 (Dec. 12, 2012).
119 Press Release, Nev. Dep’t of Bus. & Indus., Real Estate Division Issues Super Priority
Lien Advisory Opinion (Dec. 13, 2012), http://business.nv.gov/News_Media/Press_Releases
/2012/Real_Estate/Real_Estate_Division_Issues_Super_Priority_Lien_Advisory_Opinion/ [
https://perma.cc/P82N-Q6V9].
120 Id.
121 Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 335.
122 See Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at para. 17, First 100, LLC v. Burns,
No. 13A677693 (Nev. Dist. Ct. May 31, 2013), 2013 WL 8365157, at *4; Gloeckner, supra
note 4, at 335.
123 Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 122, at para. 17; Gloeckner,
supra note 4, at 335.
124 Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 335.
125 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 14, SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. Bank of Am., N.A., 334 P.3d
408 (Nev. 2014) (No. 63313).
126 Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Alessi & Koenig, LLC, 962 F. Supp. 2d. 1222, 1225
(D. Nev. 2013).
127 Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 122, at para. 33.
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increase from six months to nine.128 Because the language of NRS 116 was
nearly identical to the UCIOA, courts studied the comments of the UCIOA for
clarity.129 Section 3-116, Official Comment 1 states that the holder of the senior
lien could simply pay the delinquent assessments, thus preventing foreclosure
and maintaining their own interests.130 However, the drafters either failed to include or purposely omitted any mention of extinguishment should the first lienholder fail to pay the HOA’s assessments.131
Even seeking out clarity from one of the UCIOA drafters failed to resolve
the issue. The Common-Interest Committee of the Real Property Section of the
Nevada State Bar (“Committee”) sought direction from Carl H. Lisman, one of
the UCIOA’s drafters.132 In a letter to the Committee, Lisman stated “[t]he association enjoys a statutory limited priority ahead of a first security interest
similar to the priority given to property taxes and other governmental charges.
Because of the statutory priority, foreclosure by the association extinguishes
the first security interest and all other junior interests.”133
Although clear, pro-bank groups assert that Lisman’s letter establishes that
extinguishment is only proper when the bank has been properly joined or notified, ignoring the fact that under the Statute, notice to the lender is not required.134 Additionally, pro-bank groups assert that, as Lisman’s letter conflicts
with the UCIOA’s official comments, it should be disregarded by courts.135
Conversely, pro-HOA groups argued that pursuant to NRS 40.462, NRS
107.080, or NRS 107A.260, any foreclosure sale extinguishes junior liens.136
Because NRS 116 was enacted after NRS 40.462 and NRS 107A.260 and fails
to mention extinguishment, the legislators must have intended that foreclosures
pursuant to NRS 116 be conducted the same as all other foreclosures.137

128

Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 337–38.
Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 122, at para. 23–25.
130 Id. at para. 42.
131 Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 338.
132 Letter from Carl H. Lisman, Comm’r, Unif. Law Comm’n, to Michael E. Buckley & Karen D. Dennison, Co-Chairs, Common-Interest Comm., Nev. State Bar Real Prop. Section,
(May 29, 2013), https://www.nvbar.org/wp-content/uploads/RP_Lisman%20on%20Super%2
0Priority%20May%202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/48LY-RNXL].
133 Id.
134 Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 339.
135 Amicus Curiae Brief of the Nevada Bankers Association in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 30, SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. A-13-678858-C (Nev.
Dist. Ct. Aug. 1, 2013), 2013 WL 12357521.
136 Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 122, at para. 30 (“For example, the holder of a mortgage may initiate a judicial foreclosure via NRS 40.430 et seq. The
holder of a deed of trust may also initiate a non-judicial foreclosure (commonly known as a
‘Trustee’s Sale’) pursuant to NRS 107.080 et seq. A landlord . . . may also seek the appointment of a receiver to initiate a foreclosure upon a security instrument pursuant to NRS
107A.260.”).
137 Id. at para. 33.
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Furthermore, courts have considered public policy when raising a flag in
either the pro-HOA or pro-bank camp.138 Proponents of the HOAs have argued
that because NRS 116 requires associations to provide multiple notices to lenders, the banks have time to intervene in any proceedings.139 The NRS sets forth
the requirements for non-judicial foreclosures as: (a) “thirty days between mailing the notice of delinquent assessments and recording and mailing of the notice of default and election to sell”;140 (b) “ninety days between recording and
mailing the notice of default and recording and mailing the notice of sale”;141
and (c) “twenty-one days[’] notice between the notice of sale and the actual
sale.”142 Additionally, the HOA’s notice of Trustee’s Sale informs lenders:
“WARNING! A SALE OF YOUR PROPERTY IS IMMINENT! UNLESS
YOU PAY THE AMOUNT SPECIFIED IN THIS NOTICE BEFORE THE
SALE DATE, YOU COULD LOSE YOUR HOME, EVEN IF THE AMOUNT
IS IN DISPUTE. YOU MUST ACT BEFORE THE SALE DATE. IF YOU
HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, PLEASE CALL (name and telephone number of
the contact person for the association). IF YOU NEED ASSISTANCE, PLEASE
CALL THE FORECLOSURE SECTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN’S OFFICE,
NEVADA REAL ESTATE DIVISION, AT (toll-free telephone number designated by the Division) IMMEDIATELY.”143

Banks argue that it is grossly unfair for a third-party buyer to obtain a
property for a nominal amount, thereby extinguishing a lien that could potentially be worth far more.144 In response, the HOAs assert that the unfairness lies
in letting an innocent third-party obtain a property only to have the bank foreclose on it once more.145 To this, lenders assert that a third-party buyer should
be savvy enough to understand that the amount paid for the property is almost
certainly less than what is needed to satisfy any encumbrances, and they should
therefore take into consideration the fact that they could potentially lose the
property.146 Proponents of bank interests further argue that the delinquent assessments are almost always a nominal amount in comparison to the existing
mortgage, and that rather than creating a court system where banks feel compelled to foreclose at the first sign of trouble, instead, banks should be incentivized to help homeowners remain in their property.147 Furthermore, “[t]he services provided by an HOA are luxuries, not necessities,” and HOAs both
138

Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 343.
Appellant’s Opening Brief, at 33, SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. US Bank, N.A., 334 P.3d
408 (Nev. 2014) (No. 63078).
140 Id. at 34 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 116.31162(1)(b)–(c), 116.31163, 116.31168 (2017)).
141 Id. (citing NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 116.311635, 116.31163, 116.31168 (2017)).
142 Id. (citing NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 116.311635(1)(a), 21.130(1)(c) (2017)).
143 Id. at 36 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 116.311635(3)(b) (2017)).
144 See Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 345.
145 Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 122, at para. 39.
146 Id. at para. 40.
147 Premier One Holdings, Inc. v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, No. 2:13-cv-895-JCM
(GWF), 2013 WL 4048573, at *5 (D. Nev. Aug. 9, 2013).
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provide the least amount of services to a homeowner and assume the least
amount of risk in comparison to other lenders.148
A. The Judicial System Provides Clarity?
Finally, on September 18, 2014, in SFR Investments Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank,
the Nevada Supreme Court resolved the dispute, decisively ruling that a superpriority lien is a true lien in first position, rather than a first payment position,
and that even a non-judicial foreclosure extinguishes a mortgager’s claim.149
The Court’s opinion stated that the HOA lien is divided into two pieces, the
“super-priority piece” and the “sub-priority piece.”150 The super-priority lien is
the piece that is the true lien, and includes the nine months of unpaid assessments, maintenance, and nuisance-abatement charges.151 The sub-priority
piece, however, is subordinate to the mortgage, and includes all other fees and
assessments owed to the HOA.152
The Court, however, failed to discuss what would happen if the bank did
not receive notice, or if the HOA was uncooperative in either communication
or the reasonableness of the amounts demanded.153 Furthermore, the Court
failed to discuss the validity of HOA foreclosures where the bank attempts to
settle the amount owed and the HOA refuses to comply.154 The Court also did
not clarify if banks could take any action against third-party buyers.155 In response, the Governor of Nevada signed Senate Bill 306, which drastically
changed foreclosure proceedings when it took effect in October 2015.156 The
law created a sixty-day redemption period after a foreclosure sale for both
homeowners and lenders, clarified the amounts that could be included in the
super-priority lien, and mandated that associations notify subordinate lienholders of the foreclosure proceedings.157
Complicating matters further, in Bourne Valley v. Wells Fargo, the Ninth
Circuit interpreted the pre-2015 NRS statute, which required lenders to “opt-in”
for affirmative notices regarding foreclosures in favor of banks.158 In Bourne,
an HOA foreclosed on a property that was delinquent on assessment fees, and
the property was sold at auction and the interest conveyed to Bourne Valley
148

Id.
SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 334 P.3d 408, 413–14 (Nev. 2014).
150 Id. at 411.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 348.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Gaigalaitė, supra note 100, at 855.
157 See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 116.3116–116.31168 (2017); S.B. 306, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Nev. 2015).
158 See Bourne Valley Court Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 832 F.3d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir.
2016).
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Court Trust.159 Bourne Valley attempted to file a quiet title action, and the district court ruled that in accordance with the Court’s decision in SFR, Wells Fargo’s interest was extinguished by the foreclosure.160 When the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals heard the case, they derided the burden placed on lenders to
stay abreast of potential delinquencies in property-holders’ HOA fees.161 The
Ninth Circuit was puzzled “[h]ow the mortgage lender, which likely had no relationship with the homeowners’ association, should have known to ask [about
potential delinquencies] . . . .”162 The Ninth Circuit ultimately held that the pre2015 statute did not incorporate the notice requirements from NRS 107.090.163
This distinction led the Court to declare that NRS 116 was a facially unconstitutional violation of mortgage lenders’ due process rights, and that the mere enactment of the statute was enough to satisfy the state action requirement.164
The Nevada Supreme Court, in Saticoy Bay v. Wells Fargo, expressly declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s Bourne Valley decision.165 The Court held
that neither the Due Process or Takings Clause of the Constitution were implicated in HOA nonjudicial foreclosures, but did not determine whether NRS 116
incorporated the notice requirements in NRS 107.090.166 However, the Nevada
Supreme Court did agree to answer the certified question of:
“Whether NRS § 116.31168(1)’s incorporation of NRS § 107.090 required a
homeowner’s [sic] association to provide notices of default and/or sale to persons or entities holding a subordinate interest even when such persons or entities
did not request notice, prior to the amendments that took effect on Oct 1,
2015?”167

While awaiting the answer to this question, the potential resolution did
nothing to lessen the existing strain on the court system. Because of the split in
authority, many cases that were already years into litigation were stayed awaiting the Court’s opinion.168
159

Id.
Id. at 1156–57.
161 Id. at 1158.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 1159. See also NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.090 (2017) (requiring that notice of default
be sent to “[e]ach person who has recorded a request for a copy of the notice; and [e]ach
other person with an interest whose interest or claimed interest is subordinate to the deed of
trust.”).
164 Bourne Valley Court Tr., 832 F.3d at 1160.
165 Saticoy Bay LLC Series 350 Durango 104 v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 388 P.3d 970,
974 n.5 (Nev. 2017).
166 Id. at 971, 974.
167 Order Accepting Certified Question, Directing Briefing and Directing Submission of Filing Fee, SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 72931 (Nev. Jun. 13, 2017).
168 See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. King, No. 2:17-cv-01102-JAD-GWF, 2017 WL
5466617, at *3 (D. Nev. Nov. 14, 2017) (order staying case and denying motion for summary judgment); Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Trust, No. 2:16-cv-02721-JAD-GWF, 2017 WL
5466616, at *3 (D. Nev. Nov. 14, 2017) (order staying case and denying all pending motions); Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Northgate Homeowners Ass’n, No. 2:17-cv-02192-JAD160
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The Court eventually answered that NRS 116 had incorporated the notice
provisions of NRS 107.090 and required that notice be provided to all persons
whose liens were subordinate to the super-priority lien.169 However, this did not
mean that the express notice provisions of NRS 116—requiring notice be provided to those who had previously opted in—were rendered superfluous.170 Rather, those who could choose to opt-in to notice were not necessarily the same
as required to receive notice; therefore both the opt-in and express notice provisions served a specific purpose.171 This, the Court stated, “eliminated the redundancy of both incorporating NRS 107.090 and requiring notice to all known
lienholders . . . .”172 Thus, NRS 116’s incorporation of NRS 107.090 included
the mandate to provide notice to all subordinate interests.173 The Court declined
to address the issue of whether notice was properly given; however, the issue of
whether NRS 116 deprived banks of due process was neatly dismissed.174 With
the resolution of this question, Nevada continues its creeping towards resolution of the super-priority chaos, one issue at a time.
III. BANKS HAVE RIGHTS. HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS HAVE RIGHTS.
WHAT ABOUT THE HOMEOWNERS?
With the abundance of litigation regarding HOAs, banks, and superpriority liens and the questionable violation of home lenders’ constitutional
rights, it is easy to overlook the potential violations of homeowners’ rights.
Although Nevada legislation recognizes that one’s home is his castle,175 that
refrain loses its luster when the castle resides within the confines of a commoninterest community. For better or worse, an individual seeking to buy a home in
the Las Vegas metro area will likely have no choice but to purchase a home
that is controlled by an HOA.176 Although it is unknown how many communities exist in Nevada, as of December 2017, 3,201 HOAs were registered with

GWF, 2017 WL 5466615, at *3 (D. Nev. Nov. 14, 2017) (order staying case and denying all
pending motions); Ditech Fin. LLC v. Res. Grp. LLC, No. 2:17-cv-01823-JAD-CWH, 2017
WL 5467729, at *3 (D. Nev. Nov. 14, 2017) (order staying case and denying pending motions); Ditech Fin. LLC v. Lockmor Holdings, LLC, No. 2:17-cv-01829-JAD-PAL, 2017
WL 5467732, at *3 (D. Nev. Nov. 14, 2017) (order staying case and denying pending motions). The District Court stayed these cases on the same day due to the authority split and
awaited the Nevada Supreme Court decision.
169 SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 422 P.3d 1248, 1252 (Nev. 2018).
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 1252 n.4.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 1250 n.2, 1251, 1253 n.5.
175 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.120 (2017) (the Castle Doctrine).
176 See Chadderdon, supra note 34, at 237–39.
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the state Ombudsman, and from July through December, twenty-seven new associations were listed.177
Even if an individual chooses to purchase a home in a common-interest
community, her daily life could be drastically impacted should the board of directors change or impose new rules. Although the regulations that guaranteed
homogeny were an initial factor in the attractiveness of early common-interest
communities, today the amount of control exercised by HOAs is staggering.
Actions that would be constitutional violations if committed by a state government are allowable because they are conducted within a private neighborhood.178 While the Fourth Amendment protects private citizens against unreasonable search and seizure by a public officer, those same protections do not
extend to a private security guard employed by the community.179 Neither does
the Fourth Amendment protect homeowners from their HOA ordering a search
when a resident is reportedly a “hoarder.”180
What about First Amendment rights? Free speech doesn’t seem to be a priority within many communities, as many HOAs prohibit residents from placing
any kind of sign on their front yards.181 Furthermore, even the existence of gated communities may impinge on the Constitutional right to travel by preventing
“outsiders” from accessing what once were public streets, an issue that was litigated in Citizens Against Gated Enclaves v. Whitney Heights Civic Ass’n.182
There, the court held that a street lined with historic homes could only be removed from public use if unnecessary for transit; and the street in question was
deemed necessary.183 “The streets of a city belong to the people of the state,
and the use thereof is an inalienable right of every citizen . . . .”184
Additionally, the basic concept of living in a community where individuals
are forced to conform to a set of rules by established individuals who may or
may not possess a drop of originality (or taste, for that matter) overlooks the
177

NEV. DEP’T OF BUS. & INDUS. REAL ESTATE DIV., COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES AND
CONDOMINIUM HOTELS OMBUDSMAN’S OFFICE REPORTING PERIOD JULY 1–DECEMBER 31,
2017, at 9 (2018). http://red.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/rednvgov/Content/Meetings/CIC/2018/Su
pporting_Materials/March/Ombudsman's%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TJL2-53RW].
178 See Callies et al., supra note 8, at 188–89 (“[I]n order to wage a constitutional challenge
against a gated community for discrimination, exclusion, or a violation of civil rights and
liberties, the gated community must be deemed a ‘state actor.’ ”).
179 Id. at 190.
180 Cf. HOA Wants to Inspect Homes of People Suspected of Hoarding, ORANGE COUNTY
REG. (Jan. 18, 2011, 9:58 AM), https://www.ocregister.com/2011/01/18/hoa-wants-to-inspec
t-homes-of-people-suspected-of-hoarding/ [https://perma.cc/6MCK-TN34.] (describing proposed HOA policy allowing board members to inspect residents’ homes following reports of
suspected hoarding).
181 Chadderdon, supra note 34, at 234.
182 Citizens Against Gated Enclaves v. Whitney Heights Civic Ass’n, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451,
453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
183 Id. at 445.
184 Id. at 454 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Cty. Of Contra Costa, 154 Cal. Rptr. 374 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1979)).

19 NEV. L.J. 313, CROOKER

332

3/24/2019 5:10 PM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:1

truth that our country is far from homogenous. The very differences that HOAs
are designed to quash have led to many of the nation’s greatest achievements.
Furthermore, in a community where external perfection is demanded, and failure to adhere is met with fines (and potentially foreclosure), it is easy to forget
that the residents are individuals with struggles, such that a weed-free yard may
not be first on their list of priorities.
A. HOAs Gone Wild
HOAs frequently enforce rules that would otherwise be clear constitutional
violations if committed by a state agency. Even apart from the constitutional
aspect, the examples of HOAs promulgating regulations that lack common
sense are, unfortunately, easy to find and range from the ridiculous to the tragic.
In Palm Springs, California, a HOA imposed a conduct code that held residents responsible for their own behavior, as well as the behavior of their guests
and even vendors.185 One resident was charged fifty-dollars when her carpet
installer was caught driving seven miles over the thirty-five miles per hour
speed limit.186 Although homeowners complained that they should not be held
accountable for the behavior of a third party, the HOA responded by purchasing a radar gun.187
In Tennessee, a three-year-old girl was nearly strangled to death by the
cord on the blinds mandated by the neighborhood HOA.188 Her family spent
several thousand dollars fighting the association about the requirement, and after losing chose to move to a neighborhood without an HOA.189
After losing a leg when he stepped on a landmine, a Georgia Purple Heart
veteran was confined to a wheelchair and subsequently gifted a home where he
raises two children.190 However, his failure to properly edge his yard and his
placement of trash cans in a location easily accessed in a wheelchair led to his
HOA assessing thousands of dollars in fines and attorney’s fees and placing a
lien on his home.191
A California homeowner had her home burglarized, and accordingly requested additional outdoor lights—a request denied by her HOA.192 After
185

Jay Root, Retirees Have Carona’s Company in Crosshairs, TEX. TRIBUNE (May 21,
2013, 6:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2013/05/21/california-retirees-rebel-against-h
oa/ [https://perma.cc/QG5D-Q6CT].
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Judy L. Thomas, HOAs from Hell: More Horror Stories, More Fraud—and Prospect of
Legislative Action, KAN. CITY STAR (Dec. 24, 2016 8:44 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/ne
ws/special-reports/hoa/article122547749.html [https://perma.cc/7AC3-H8AP].
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Ass’n, 723 P.2d 573, 575 (Cal. 1986).
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choosing to install the lights anyway, the HOA forced her to dismantle them, a
process which required her to shut off all other outdoor lights.193 The night the
lights were shut down, a burglar again broke into her home, robbing and raping
her.194
These stories illustrate the horror that can arise from living in a community
whose directors lack common sense. However, there are less dramatic stories
about individuals who are ordered to paint their homes or make repairs and lack
the financial means to do so. Should a homeowner be jailed for failing to comply with his HOA’s landscaping mandates, after an increase in his adjustable
rate mortgage left him short on cash?195 Is it right for a man to lose his home
after incurring fines for planting too many roses?196 Should a woman whose
husband is serving in Iraq be fined $1,000 for displaying a sign that says “Support Our Troops”?197 Is it right for a woman raising five foster children to face
eviction, because the association equated her state aid of $2,028 a month with
running a business?198 Every story features real people who have faced real distress as a result of their HOA.
At the heart of Nevada’s super-priority epidemic are the people who have
lost their homes. Some homeowners certainly made poor financial choices,
overextending themselves and purchasing homes in communities that were far
too expensive. However, the above stories illustrate the plethora of reasons that
HOAs can and do impose fines, adding exponentially to the burdens of individuals already struggling.
B. Hands in the Cookie Jar
In addition to promulgating rules that defy common sense, HOAs, by nature, provide a large opportunity for financial abuse, a situation that seems to
occur far too often in Nevada. In Las Vegas, two homeowners, one of them a
board member, living in an age-qualified community became suspicious that
the HOA was not returning excess dues to its homeowners.199 The men unwisely chose to lodge an allegation of forgery with the local police, and after conducting an investigation, the police arrested the two homeowners for lodging a
193
194
195

Id. at 576.
Id.
Erin Sullivan, Residents Break Out Green Thumb, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Oct. 13, 2008, at

1A.
196

Paul Bannister, Homeowner Horror Stories: Associations are Heaven or Hell,
BANKRATE (Jan. 1, 2004), https://www.bankrate.com/finance/real-estate/homeowner-horrorstories-associations-are-heaven-or-hell.aspx [https://perma.cc/AR3A-HF8N].
197 Stephanie Hayes, Under Public Eye, Sign Disappears, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Apr. 29, 2006,
at 3B.
198 Bannister, supra note 196.
199 J. Patrick Coolican, Don’t Question Your HOA or You Might Get Arrested, LAS VEGAS
SUN (Mar. 30, 2012, 2:00 AM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2012/mar/30/dont-question-yo
ur-hoa-or-you-might-get-arrested/ [https://perma.cc/3T93-ZTRG].
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false complaint.200 However, the IRS conducted an audit of the HOA and determined that the association was in fact holding funds that should have been
returned to the homeowners, in excess of $1 million.201
In another instance, a common-interest association manager embezzled
$1.6 million from various HOAs by using electronic signatures to transfer
money not approved by HOA boards into her own business accounts.202 Yet
another property manager hired by an HOA wrote checks to her construction
company for work done to the community properties.203 The checks were
signed by herself and a man who she claimed was an HOA board member.204
However, far from being a homeowner—his association with the community
was limited to the janitorial services he provided to them.205
The biggest scandal to rock the common-interest communities occurred
when a local construction boss, Leon Benzer, was convicted of accomplishing
HOA takeovers by hiring straw men to apply for board positions, and then rigging the elections to ensure his candidates were elected.206 The HOAs then proceeded to engage in construction defect litigation, directing the cases towards
law firms complicit in the arrangement.207 The corrupt boards would then hire
Benzer’s construction company who, rather than fixing the alleged defects,
passed the funds along to Benzer instead.208
C. No More Block Parties
In addition to presenting opportunities for fraud, common-interest communities often serve to deter the creation of what their name would suggest: community.209 Planned developments originally gained popularity in part because
of the homogeneity that they provided; soon, communities realized that they
could use the restrictive covenant to control not just the appearance of homes,
but of the residents as well. The restrictive covenant “runs with the land” and
has the power to bind future homeowners to its provisions. At one point, cove200
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nants were created that prohibited non-white families from purchasing homes
in certain neighborhoods, and this practice continued until 1948 when the Supreme Court, in Shelley v. Kraemer, expanded the state action doctrine to provide that courts could not enforce racially restrictive covenants.210
However, the sentiments that existed in 1948 still manifest themselves in
common-interest communities today. Although communities may not be for
“whites only,” the mentality of “us versus them” is alive and well.211 The decline of the middle class has sparked a fear to preserve “niceness,” a concern
that notably is more prominent “for those who only recently attained middleclass status.”212 Furthermore, communities with more prominent social and cultural diversity tend to have more rules and regulations.213 Some communities
have rules preventing trucks, discouraging residents who work in labor positions.214 Gates, both literal and figurative, exist to keep “us” from “them,” both
inside and outside the community.215 One author aptly describes the commoninterest community as “a metaphor to describe the two Americas.”216
Although some scholars have suggested that common-interest communities
be subject to the analysis in Marsh v. Alabama, courts have been reticent to
consider common-interest communities and HOAs as state actors, and thus subject to the same Constitutional limits as a municipality.217 The rationale underlying courts’ reluctance to apply significant restraints to HOAs arises partly out
of the freedom to contract.218 The theory is that individuals choose to reside in
common-interest communities, and by entering into a contract with an HOA
freely choose to be bound by its terms.219
This logic however, only prevails if individuals have a choice to purchase
in a non-HOA community, and if individuals are fully aware of the rights they
are relinquishing to their neighbors when they choose to purchase within an
210
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Action Doctrine, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV 201, 209 (2012) (“Racial segregation was a marketing tool for early common interest community developers, and racial restrictive covenants
were an intentional result of the planned community movement to which all community associations owe their existence.”).
211 See Franzese, supra note 5, at 346.
212 Id. at 345.
213 Id.
214 See Boudreaux, supra note 9, at 492–93.
215 Franzese, supra note 5, at 346.
216 Id. at 347.
217 Gott, supra note 210, at 206–07. The Court determined in Marsh v. Alabama that a company-owned town could not “govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a State statute.”
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946). The town functioned like any other municipality but was privately owned. Id. The Court held that the town’s ownership was not enough to
justify depriving its residents or visitors of constitutional rights. Id.
218 Gott, supra note 210, at 204.
219 Id. at 211.

19 NEV. L.J. 313, CROOKER

336

3/24/2019 5:10 PM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:1

HOA community. Yet, with planned communities becoming the norm, the
choice whether to reside in a common-interest community is becoming nonexistent.220 Furthermore, many individuals have stated that they were unaware
of the scope of their community’s CC&Rs when they purchased their home.221
IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
While HOAs do serve some positive roles, such as alleviating some of the
burden from local municipalities and providing communities with assurances of
a stable neighborhood aesthetic, they also possess the power to infringe on
many individual rights.222 The super-priority lien epidemic in Nevada demonstrates how much power these associations have, and how frequently the power
is wielded.223 The question now becomes: how do we move forward? It is unlikely that developers and cities will suddenly decide to cease the construction
of common-interest communities, and the judicial system has thus far shown
itself unwilling to drastically curtail the HOA’s reach. The task, then, falls to
our legislature to consider implementing safeguards which would not strip
HOAs of their power, but rather ensure that the rights and power of the HOA
and the homeowner are equitably balanced.
A.

The Path Forward is Paved with Legislation

One approach to constrain HOAs is to adopt the approach proffered by the
Restatement (Third) of Property. The Restatement would dictate that HOAs
“treat members fairly” and that they “act reasonably in the exercising of its discretionary powers including rulemaking, enforcement, and design-control powers.”224 Additionally, the Restatement would constrain HOAs to “govern the
use of individually owned property to protect the common property.”225 Furthermore, HOA boards would only possess the power to “adopt reasonable
rules designed to . . . protect community members from unreasonable interference in the enjoyment of their individual lots or units and the common property
caused by use of other individually owned lots or units . . . .”226 HOAs would
lack the power to inhibit “the use or occupancy of, or behavior within” a home,
unless authorized by the master declaration.227
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Other scholars have suggested practical approaches to the HOA dilemma,
several of which Nevada would be wise to consider. First, the State should require that all HOA board members undertake annual ethics and financial training.228 This would ensure that board members otherwise unsuited to run a large
community would at least have a foundation of knowledge about their responsibilities to their community members.229 Furthermore, every HOA should be
required to build into their budget a portion that would pay for regular thirdparty audits.230 The results of the audit and a breakdown of how the community’s funds are being spent should be distributed to each homeowner. This
would both provide board members with accountability, and homeowners with
transparency.
Finally, Nevada should create a statutory memorialization of homeowners’
rights. Because courts have been reluctant to assign HOAs the same limitations
that municipalities are bound by, it is difficult for a homeowner to prevail
should they challenge their board of directors about an alleged violation.231 Nevada is a national example of the legal maelstrom that can be created by an imbalance of power between homeowners and HOAs.232 The reality exists that
HOAs in Nevada, as well as the rest of the country, do commit acts that would
be Constitutional violations if undertaken by a state government.233 The irony
of this situation is that federal courts have recognized that HOAs violated
banks’ rights by not providing notice of an impending foreclosure. How then,
can the State ignore the infringement of individual rights committed by HOAs?
To combat this situation, the State must recognize that homeowners have
specific rights upon which HOAs cannot encroach, and that can be enforced in
a court of law if necessary.234 These rights need not be as broad as those granted by the Constitution, but they should include a right to free speech, or expression.235 This right should allow homeowners some limited ability to share their
beliefs with the outside world.236 This freedom need not allow a resident to
cover their yard with hundreds of political signs or paint a flag on their garage,
but it should create a limited ability for individual expression.237 Homeowners
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should be free to support the troops, advertise their candidate of choice in the
upcoming election, or express their spirituality.238
States must also recognize a right to privacy.239 The State should expressly
recognize that the HOA can constrain only the exterior of a property. Anything
that occurs within the house—any activity, decoration, or paraphernalia—
should be entirely within the control of the homeowner and not subject to
comment or criticism by the HOA.240 Homeowners can build forts in their entryway, walk around naked, invite company over for weeks at a time, and hang
purple curtains in the living room if that is how they wish to spend their time
and money. These two simple rights would provide homeowners some choice
whether to conform to a sterile aesthetic or to maintain some enjoyment in the
property that they own. These rights, coupled with the reasonableness requirements suggested by the Restatement, would serve to provide balance to common-interest communities and restore to homeowners a little of the freedom
intended by purchasing land in fee simple absolute.
CONCLUSION
Nevada is a perfect example of the widespread problems that can result
when homeowners’ associations wield too much power. Super-priority liens
have been litigated for years, and still, associations, banks, and homeowners are
uncertain of what will happen in the event of an HOA foreclosure. Even those
who have not faced a nonjudicial foreclosure or do not live in a commoninterest community have been affected. A recent study showed that HOA foreclosures have reduced property values in Nevada’s two most populated counties by over $1 billion.241 Homes foreclosed by an HOA in Clark County over
the last few years were sold at an average discount of 42 percent.242 Thankfully,
home values in Nevada have begun to increase, and HOA foreclosures did
begin to slow slightly after the Court’s decision in SFR.243 The dust is beginning to settle: now is the time to step back and look at the big picture. Nevada’s
unique situation perfectly captures the irony of the HOA: organizations that
were originally created to preserve the value of neighborhoods now are contributing to a decrease in neighborhood values because of their active role in
the foreclosure process.244 The potential for harm—to homeowners, banks, and
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the economy—will always exist so long as HOAs exercise too much control.
This problem cannot be allowed to continue.
Although Nevada has made some efforts towards correcting the existing
imbalance of power, such as the creation of the Office of Ombudsman, it is not
enough.245 HOAs will always hold the upper hand until the State recognizes
that homeowners have rights that demand to be enforced. And, ultimately, so
too do HOAs. The ultimate goal should not be to put the reins solely into the
hands of homeowners, but rather to distribute power equally. At the end of the
day, for every horror story of an HOA run by blue-haired busybodies who seek
to strip their communities of any trace of personality, there is an HOA truly
committed to keeping its community a pleasant place to live. HOAs exist for
the purpose of maintaining common spaces, protecting property values, and
eliminating major problems that could become a neighborhood nuisance.
Should the power between homeowners and HOAs be equally shared, there is a
better chance of this purpose being achieved. Will communities remain shining
pictures of homogeny? Probably not. Hopefully not. But, the destruction of perfection may serve a more important goal—people may just have to talk to each
other and relearn how to resolve issues amongst themselves, rather than running to their board of directors. And perhaps, in letting go of perfection, common-interest communities will regain community.
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